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Underpaid or Overpaid? Wage Analysis for
Nurses Using Job and Worker Attributes
Barry T. Hirsch* and Edward J. Schumacher!
Nursing shortages are commoti despite the fact that nurses earn far higher wages than other
college-educated women. Our analysis addresses the puzzle of "high" nursing wages. Employee
data from the Current Population Survey are matched with detailed job descriptors from the
Occupational Information Network. Nursing requires high levels of compensable skills and
demanding working conditions. Standard log wage regression estimates indicate nursing wage
advantages of about 40%. Accounting for job attributes reduces estimates to roughly 20%.
Rather than transforming ordinary least squares log gaps to percentages, alternative methods
measuring Mincerian gaps produce estimates of 15% or less. We conclude that nurses receive
compensation that is much closer to opportunity costs than that seen in standard analyses,
narrowing the shortage puzzle. Supply constraints in nurse licensing can produce wages above
long-run opportunity costs but that are too low to clear short-run labor markets during periods
of growing demand. The analysis provides broader implications for the conduct of wage
analyses.
JEL Classification: 112, J31, J44
1. Introduction
Registered nurses (RNs) are widely believed to be in short supply, with hospitals having
reported unfilled vacancies over sustained periods and shortfalls in future supplies of RNs
widely predicted.' Sustained shortages of RNs present a puzzle. Shortages are seemingly
inconsistent with a theory of competitive markets, wherein wages tend toward levels equating
to labor demand and supply.^ Low wages and shortages can exist in monopsonistic labor
* Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA
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' See National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2002); Spetz and Given (2003); and Aiken and Cheung (2008).
Buerhaus, Auerbach, and Staiger (2009) show there have been recent increases in nursing supply and that shortages
have eased, but they argue forcefully that they will return.
^ Our discussion applies to "economic" shortages, which exist when there is excess demand (vacancies) at the current
wage level or, in a dynamic setting, labor demand increasing faster than supply and wages slow to adjust. The nursing
human resource literature often focuses on "need-based" or "professional standards" shortages, in which the available
number of RNs is less than the number regarded as necessary to properly serve a given market (see Folland, Goodman,
and Stano 2007, pp. 338-44; Goldfarb, Goldfarb, and Long 2008).
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markets, yet evidence supporting nursing monopsony is neither abundant nor compelling (e.g.,
Hirsch and Schumacher 2005). Moreover, wage analyses indicate that RN relative wages have
increased markedly over time and are well in excess of the wages received by other college-
educated women. Based on wage analyses, an argument can be made that RNs are "overpaid."
Based on evidence of shortages, an argument can be made that RNs are on average
"underpaid." Less evident is how both views can be correct.
In this study we address the nursing wage-employment puzzle and attempt to answer the
following question: Are nurses paid wages below, above, or equal to long-run opportunity
costs? We combine Current Population Survey (CPS) data containing information on
individual RN and non-RN wages and attributes with data providing a rich set of job content
descriptors measuring occupational skills and working conditions. The job descriptors, taken
from the Occupation Information Network (O*NET), show that nursing jobs require relatively
high levels of skill and have demanding working conditions. Incorporating the O*NET job
content measures into the CPS analysis sharply reduces estimates of relative RN wages. A shift
from ordinary least squares (OLS) Mincerian log wage gap estimates to alternative measures of
percentage wage differences further reduces estimates of the RN wage gap, indicating that RNs
are paid wages only moderately above long-run opportunity costs.
Our analysis does not "solve" the RN shortage puzzle stated at the outset, but it does
sharply reduce its dimensions. We suggest that increasing demand for RNs combined with
barriers to and sluggish growth in RN training can result in periodic shortages and permit RN
wages to persist at levels above opportunity costs. Although our analysis focuses on wages
rather than total compensation, we provide evidence indicating that results would be largely
unaffected if nonwage benefits were included as well. Because evening shift work is common for
hospital nurses but is not directly measured in O*NET, we provide a "back of the envelope"
estimate of how it would affect the nursing wage gap.
Apart from addressing the wage-employment puzzle among registered nurses, the analysis
provides two more general implications. First, labor market wage analyses are enriched
through the consideration of job content measures of skill and working conditions. Second,
Mincerian log wage differentials are not necessarily appropriate when the tails of the wage
distribution differ markedly between treatment and control groups.^ In what follows we first
review theory and evidence on nursing wages and employment. We then discuss construction of
the matched CPS/O*NET database and provide evidence on how RNs compare to other
college-educated workers in terms of wages, required job skills, and working conditions.
2. Theory and Evidence on Nursing Labor Markets
Competitive labor markets have multiple employers, minimal entry barriers among workers
and firms, worker mobility across employers, and good information among workers and
employers regarding employment and wage opportunities. Such markets should produce wages
that are roughly the same among similarly skilled workers with similar preferences who perform
similar levels of work (i.e., skills and working conditions), the so-called "law of one wage."
•* The first point is a theme addressed in other recent articles, most notably that of Autor and Handel (2009). The second
point has been made by Blackburn (2007).
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Of course, there is not literally a common wage for identical workers in identical jobs.
Even in highly competitive markets, search frictions and idiosyncratic factors (often not
measurable) among workers, jobs, and locations generate wage differences. Factors shifting
labor demand and supply change continually, so wages move toward but do not mechanically
achieve levels that equilibrate demand and supply. Yet if wages are approximately competitive,
we do not expect to see a sustained shortage (unfilled vacancies) or sustained surplus of
qualified but unemployed applicants.''
Because high vacancy levels in nursing positions are common, a natural explanation
to consider is monopsonistic power among employers, particularly in hospitals, where a
majority of RNs are employed. The canonical competitive model views employers such as
hospitals as "price (wage) takers" that face perfectly elastic firm-level nursing supply curves.
The pure monopsony model assumes a labor market with a single employer with no mobility
across occupations or labor markets. A profit-maximizing monopsonist pays wages below
competitive levels and, thus, must reduce employment (output) given a shortage of workers
at that wage. Real-world nursing markets do not satisfy the assumptions of pure
competition or monopsony. Even in small markets with few nursing employers, RNs have
some ability to move between employers and across labor markets. Even in large markets
with hundreds of hospital and non-hospital nursing employers, employers do not literally
face a horizontal labor supply curve. "New monopsony" models focus on worker-specific
attachment to firms and immobility arising from sources other than employer concentration
(Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002; Manning 2003) and expect wages to vary with the
elasticity of labor supply.
While monopsony power of hospitals is a potential explanation for shortages, we do not
directly address it here. First, there is rather limited direct evidence supporting either classic
or new monopsony in nursing markets, with RNs exhibiting substantial mobility across
employers.^ Second, wage studies indicate that RNs earn not less but rather considerably more
than similar non-RN employees (Hirsch and Schumacher 2005). If RNs realize sizable wage
premiums, shortages are all the more puzzling.
Our focus on the role of job attributes on nursing wages is not without precedent.
Although we are unaware of studies emphasizing unmeasured nursing skills, several studies
have noted the importance of working conditions with regard to RN labor supply or wages.
Shields (2004) suggests that nursing labor supply may be more sensitive to non-pecuniary job
aspects than wages, an emphasis seen often among articles in health practitioner journals. Di
Tommaso et al. (2009) conclude that nursing labor supply in Norway is relatively inelastic with
respect to wages but sensitive to the type of workplace and shift work. A similar finding for
Finland is provided by Kankaanranta and Rissanen (2009). There is little literature relating RN
wages to workplace disamenities, although Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) examine how RN
" Factors that break down equivalency between spot wages and productivity include firm-specific (i.e., nontransferable)
skills, compensation tied to company seniority independent of skill, defined benefit pensions penalizing quits among
young workers, earnings linked to group rather than individual productivity, and pay based on time input rather than
hard-to-measure output. Nominal wages differ across geographic labor markets as a result of differences in area
amenities, prices, productivity (due, say, to agglomeration economies), and state and local fiscal policies (Moretti
2010).
^ For evidence and references, see Hirsch and Schumacher (2005) and a recent study by Matsudaira (2010). An exception
to the generalization in the text is a study by Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs (2010), who find a very low labor supply
elasticity among RNs in Veterans Affairs hospitals.
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wages differ based on workplace type and time of shift. Given the potential importance of non-
pecuniary job attributes, we explore the role of occupational skills, job tasks, and working
conditions on nursing wages as well as the implication of our results in terms of understanding
RN shortages.
3. Wage Data from the CPS
Data on individual workers used in our wage analysis are from the CPS Outgoing
Rotation Group (ORG) monthly earnings files for January 2005 through June 2008.* The
CPS-ORG files include the quarter sample of households for whom the earnings supplement
is administered. Our sample includes all employed non-student, full-time wage and salary
workers who are age 20 and over, who report their earnings (i.e., those with imputed
earnings are excluded), and who have an associate degree (academic or vocational), a BA, or
an MA.^
Our wage is a measure of usual average earnings per hour on one's primary job. The
straight-time wage is reported directly in the CPS for hourly workers, including most RNs. This
is used as our wage measure for workers without tips, overtime, or commissions. For salaried
workers, plus hourly workers receiving supplemental pay, the wage is calculated as usual
weekly earnings (inclusive of tips, overtime, and commissions) divided by usual hours worked
per week.^  For the few workers reporting variable usual hours, we use hours worked the
previous week to calculate hourly earnings. For workers whose weekly earnings are top-coded
(at $2885), mean earnings above the cap are assigned based on gender-specific estimates
assuming a Pareto distribution in the upper tail.' All earnings figures are stated in January
2008 U.S. dollars. To reduce noise due to recording or reporting errors, a small number
of observations with extreme implicit wage values (less than S3 and $150 or greater) are
excluded.'"
As seen in Table 1, average hourly earnings for RNs from 2005 through June 2008 is
$29.45, 7.4% more than the $27.43 average for the college control group (means are calculated
using sample weights). Focusing instead on the difference in the mean log wage, the RN wage
advantage is .178 log points (19.5%), more than double the gap based on arithmetic means."
* As discussed below, the CPS is matched to O*NET data issued in June 2007 based on job analyst and incumbent
reports in the months and years preceding the release date.
' Part-time workers (defined as less than 35 usual hours worked per week on their principal job) are excluded from the
comparison group sample but not the RN sample. Wage differences between full-time and part-time RNs are very
small, so results with part-time RNs excluded are nearly identical to those presented.
" CPS wage measures include pay resulting from shift work, a topic discussed subsequently.
' Estimated mean earnings are about 1.6 times the cap for women and 1.8 times the cap for men. Estimates by gender
and year (since 1973) are calculated by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson and are posted at http://www.
unionstats.com.
'" Bollinger and Chandra (2005) show that trimming (deleting) or winsorizing (recoding) extreme values can induce or
exacerbate bias and is generally not justified. They find 1% trimming has little effect, but a level of 5% induces
nontrivial bias. We exclude just 0.2% and 0.3% of the RN and control group observations, respectively. Inclusion of
the outliers increases mean wages by 9, 14, and 20 cents for RNs, female controls, and male controls, respectively,
while at the same time noticeably increasing variance.
" Percentage approximations are calculated using 100[exp(ß) - 1], where ß is the coefficient on the RN dummy. As
noted by Kennedy (1981), a more precise (but still biased) estimate would account for the variance of the estimate. The
Kennedy adjustment reduces most percentage gaps shown in the article by a tenth of 1%.
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Table 1. Wages among RNs and the Comparison Group, with and without Imputed Earners
Estimation sample:
excludes imputed earners
Real wage
Log wage
Sample size
Full sample: includes
imputed earners
Real wage
Log wage
Sample size
Nonresponse rate (%)
RNs
29.45(11.62)
3.3144 (.3716)
8292
28.21 (12.96)
3.2456 (.4413)
11,514
28.0
College Control
Group
27.43 (19.40)
3.1398 (.5631)
135,593
27.37 (19.58)
3.1323 (.5727)
190,119
28.7
Women
23.18(14.11)
3.0081 (.5054)
64,565
23.17 (14.45)
3.0018 (.5168)
90,082
28.3
Men
31.11 (22.38)
3.2539 (.5852)
71,028
30.98 (22.49)
3.2447 (.5944)
100,037
29.0
Shown are weighted means using CPS sample weights, with standard deviations in parentheses. Samples include
those with at least an associate degree and no greater than a MA degree. Samples excluding imputed earners are used in
all empirical work. Weighted median wages and median log wages are $27.68 and 3.3207 for RNs and $22.58 and 3.1170
for the college control group. Not shown in the table are means for the imputed sample. The mean imputed dollar wage
(log wage) for nonrespondent RNs is $25.30 (3.0849).
The difference reflects a compressed RN (occupation-specific) wage distribution, as compared
to the control group's longer right and left tails. The coefficient of variation (CV) of RN wages
is 39.5 ([11.62/29.45] 100) compared to 70.7 for the comparison group wage.'^ These highly
different distributions indicate that something other than the standard approach for estimating
percentage wage gaps should be considered (Blackburn 2007).
Excluded from the analysis are workers who do not report their earnings and thus have
their hourly wage and/or usual weekly earnings imputed: 28.0% of the RNs and 28.7% of the
control group sample. Such exclusion is important since nonresponding nurses (and other
workers) are generally assigned earnings of "donors" in other occupations (broad, not detailed,
occupation is a donor match criterion). Inclusion of imputed workers causes a substantial
attenuation in wage gap estimates (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; Bollinger and Hirsch 2006).
The final sample size following the above exclusions is 143,885, which includes 8292 RNs and
135,593 employees in the college comparison group.
Means for the full sample, including imputed earners, are shown in the bottom portion of
Table 1. The impact of imputed values is readily evident. As expected, mean wages for the
broad control group are similar for the two samples ($27.43 excluding and $27.37 including
imputations). But inclusion of imputed earners, most of whom are likely to be assigned the
earnings of a non-RN donor, reduces mean earnings for RNs from $29.45 absent imputations
to $28.21 with imputations (mean log wages decline by .069 log points). RNs who report their
wage display a 16.4% wage advantage (and a .230 log wage advantage) over the $25.30 (or a
3.085 log point) mean of the imputed wage among nonrespondent RNs.
The importance of gender, absent other covariates, can be seen by breaking out the
average male and female wages of the control group. The average RN wage of $29.45 is well
above the $23.18 mean wage for college women but below the $31.11 average for college men.
Using log points, the RN unadjusted wage advantage is .306 relative to women and .060
'^  Although most occupations have low within-occupation wage dispersion compared to a broad control group, we find
that among major occupations RNs exhibit one of the lowest (unconditional) dispersion levels.
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relative to men. In the wage analysis that follows, gender is found to be relatively unimportant
following conditioning on job attributes.
4. Earnings and Job Tasks: Skill and Working Conditions Indices from O*NET
The O*NET, produced by the U.S. Department of Labor's Employment and Training
Administration, is a comprehensive database system for collecting, organizing, and describing
data on job characteristics and worker attributes within occupations. Since the release of
O*NET 1.0 in 1998, the database has been extended and updated based on input from job
analysts and job incumbents. O*NET replaces the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT),
used in numerous studies by economists and other social scientists (recent examples include
Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Ingram and Neumann 2006). Use of O*NET in economic
studies is limited but rapidly growing.'^
We use O*NET 12.0, released in June 2007, and we created a data set with 259 O*NET
occupational job descriptors (from an initial 488 descriptors in the database).''' The job
descriptors cover a wide range of attributes, including abilities that infiuence the acquisition
and application of knowledge in problem solving to psychomotor, physical, and sensory
abilities to social, technical, and complex problem-solving skills. Most O*NET variables
involve required workplace tasks or skills necessary to successfully perform a job or conditions
faced by workers in a given occupation. We construct multiple indices of skill-related job tasks
and physical working conditions from the O*NET database using factor analysis.
To examine how pay varies with job attributes, the O*NET measures are merged with CPS
data on individual workers. O*NET and the CPS identify detailed occupations using Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) codes. The CPS identifies workers in 502 civilian SOC cate-
gories, whereas O*NET provides a more detailed SOC breakdown, with 798 civilian occupations.
The crosswalk between O*NET and the CPS occupations is reasonably straightforward.'^
'•* Hirsch (2005) matches O*NET job attributes to the CPS to help explain wage differences between part- and full-time
workers. Autor and Handel (2009) compare O*NET occupation measures with worker-reported job task measures
included in a special survey. Abraham and Spletzer (2009) match O*NET measures to the CPS and the Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) in order to analyze the returns to job skills. Perri and Sparber (2009) use O*NET
measures of physical tasks and language ability requirements among the jobs held by immigrant and native workers to
analyze how immigration afTects job task specialization and relative wages. Chiswick and Miller (2010) use O*NET
language requirement measures and the 2000 U.S. Census to better understand earnings and the matching of
immigrants to jobs.
'" The CPS/O*NET database was created jointly by one of the authors and economists at Global Insight. Most O*NET
job descriptors are measured using an "importance" and a "level" scale, with these values being highly correlated.
Descriptors measured in level form were retained and the "duplicative" descriptors eliminated, reducing the number
of O*NET descriptors from 488 to 259 with little loss in information. A small number of mainly small occupations
had not yet released revised ratings since the initial version of O*NET.
" There is a one-to-one match from O*NET to the CPS for 316 occupations, including RNs. Most of the remaining
involve a mapping of two or more O'NET occupations to a CPS category. In these cases, O*NET descriptor values
are calculated based on the weighted average across the component O*NET occupations, using May 2005
employment reported in the OES as weights. A small number of CPS occupational categories are made up of a
combination of O*NET categories defined at such a fine level of detail that OES employment figures are not available.
In these cases, component O*NET occupations are assigned equal weights. A small number of CPS occupations are
identified as "all other" categories (e.g., "information and records clerks, other"), for which there are no O*NET
ratings. These CPS occupation codes were assigned O*NET values based on average ratings (using employment
weights) among similar occupations.
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The merged CPS/O*NET database allows us to address whether a CPS-only analysis .
understates or overstates the nursing wage gap. CPS variables account for individual worker
characteristics but not job attributes. Combining O*NET with the CPS allows us to account
more directly for occupational skill requirements, job tasks, and working conditions that
influence wages.'* Because worker skills are measured imperfectly by schooling, potential
experience, and other variables in the CPS, accounting for job tasks also helps control for
worker-specific skills.
There is no consensus regarding a best method for collapsing a large number of
occupational job descriptors into a few informative variables. We opt for a relatively simple
approach, using factor analysis to create a single index measure of working conditions and four
"skill/job task" indices. We use 206 of the total 259 O*NET variables in our database.'^ Of
these 206 attributes, 38 physical working conditions measures are used to create a single index
of working conditions. The remaining 168 job descriptors are used to construct indices of job
skill/tasks based on the first four factors. Factors beyond the first four had relatively low
eigenvalues and provide minimal additional information.'^
The factor analysis constructs multiple occupational indices that reflect a "principled"
collapsing of O*NET skill/task and working condition attributes." The factor indices are
constructed independently of the CPS wage data that they are intended to help explain. The
first factor loads all O*NET attributes in a way that accounts for a maximum proportion of the
CO variance across attributes and occupations. A second factor accounts for a maximum
proportion of the remaining covariance, and so forth. Our factor analysis is weighted by
occupational employment, compiled from the CPS for all wage and salary workers. By
construction, the factors have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.0 across the entire
workforce. These factors and their loadings are described below.
Based on its factor loadings, we title skill/task factor 1 (SKI) "cognitive skills." SKI
accounts for 41% of the total covariance among the 168 skill/task attributes across the 501
Census occupations. SKI heavily loads such O*NET measures as critical thinking, judgment
and decision making, monitoring, written expression, speaking, writing, active listening, written
comprehension, active learning, negotiation, and persuasion. Skill/task factor 2 (SK2), titled
"mechanical skills," accounts for 14% of the covariance and heavily loads measures such as
mechanical skills, repairing and maintaining equipment, installation, troubleshooting, and
operation monitoring and control. Skill/task factor 3 iSK3), which we title "assisting and caring
for others," accounts for 7% of the covariance and heavily loads measures such as assisting
and caring for others, responsibility for others' health and safety, concern for others, and
" Autor and Handel (2009) and Ingram and Neumann (2006) discuss the advantages of usingjob (occupation) attributes
in addition to or instead of individual attributes in order to measure the returns to skill. Ingram and Neumann provide
a careful discussion of factor analysis, which they use to create skill indices from the DOT.
" Excluded were 26 "physical ability" attributes (e.g., finger dexterity, gross body coordination, and near vision) that
can be considered neither workplace disamenities nor scarce compensable skills; six worker "Interest" attributes
(investigative, social, realistic, etc.); and a set of 21 "Values" attributes (how well does this occupation satisfy needs for
ability utilization, compensation, helping others, etc.) intended to help train and match individuals with appropriate
occupations.
' The analysis attempts to control for relevant (i.e., wage-determining) job attributes based on multiple measures, each
of which is an imperfect proxy for the underlying wage determinant. Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2005) show that in
such situations, the use of multiple proxies rather than a single measure reduces bias on the variable of interest.
Bollinger and Minier (2009) extend their analysis and show that use of a single proxy (or too few proxies) may also
bias coefficients on other correctly measured variables.
" Descriptions of factor analysis are provided in Gorsuch (1983) and Ingram and Neumann (2006).
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knowledge in various medical, science, and social science fields relevant to occupations
involving assistance to others. Skill/task factor 4 iSK4), which we title "administration,
management, and sales," accounts for 5% of the covariance and heavily loads skill/task
variables reflecting sales and marketing knowledge; responsibility for outcomes and results;
staffing organizational units; selling or influencing others; monitoring and controlling
resources; guiding, directing, and motivating subordinates; management of personnel
resources; and dealing with external customers.
Factor index WC accounts for 56% of the total covariance among the 38 working
condition attributes. WC includes job attributes typically included in studies of compensating
differentials. WC heavily loads attributes such as dynamic and static strength; very hot and cold
temperatures; extremely bright or inadequate lighting; exposure to contaminants; cramped
work space or awkward position; exposure to burns, cuts, bites, or stings; and exposure to
hazardous equipment. As is widely recognized, it is difficult to identify compensable working
conditions, in part because heterogeneous worker preferences influence occupational choice
(worker-job sorting), and because workers with high wages (for reasons that cannot be fully
controlled) tend to sort into jobs with fewer disamenities (Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard 1992).
Using the merged CPS/O*NET database, we provide descriptive evidence comparing skill/
task and working condition attributes for RNs and college-educated workers economy-wide.
Note that the O*NET evaluation of the RN occupation represents an average across multiple RN
jobs in and outside of hospitals. The CPS also provides a single RN occupation code but allows
one to identify the industry of employment (e.g., hospitals). Because the composite O*NET
ratings apply to an average across all RNs, our analysis does not make a distinction among RNs
employed in different settings. Table 2 provides the means of the O*NET indices for RNs and the
comparison group, shown jointly and separately by gender. Index SKI (cognitive skills/tasks), the
first principal factor constructed from the 168 O*NET job descriptors, is an extremely strong
correlate of earnings. The college workforce (i.e., those with associate, BA, and MA degrees,
excluding RNs) has a mean SKI of .63, with equivalent values for women and men, substantially
higher than the zero mean for all wage and salary workers. The standard deviation is .81, slightly
below the 1.0 value for the economy-wide sample. RNs exhibit a substantially higher SKI index
rating in O*NET than does the college control group, a 1.10 value that is more than a half
standard deviation higher than the control group mean of .63.
The additional skill/task-related factors account for far less of the total variation in job
attributes and are more weakly related to earnings than is SKI. As expected, mean SK2
(mechanical skills/tasks) among college-educated women is far below the average across the
male average (-0.46 vs. 0.33). The RN value of -0.44 is nearly identical to the female average.
The third index, SK3 (assisting and caring), heavily weights job requirements related to
assisting the health and well-being of others. The mean for college women is .01, effectively
equal to the economy-wide average; college men have a substantially lower average of -0.32.
Not surprisingly, RNs have one of the highest averages across all occupations, with a SK3
factor index value of 2.08, two standard deviations above the economy-wide average.^"
Turning to working conditions, the college workforce has a mean WC value of — .48, — .65
among women and —.27 among men. The negative value for WC and positive value for SKI
reflect the relatively good working conditions and high level of skills that typically characterize
^^  Folbre and Nelson (2000) argue that jobs involving caring are more likely to attract women and pay less. We find that
SK3 (assisting and caring tasks) enters negatively and significantly into wage equations.
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Table 3a. O*NET Skill Attributes for Which RNs Rate High: Percentile Rank and
Wage Correlations
Description RN Rank Simple Wage Correlation
Abilities—enduring attributes of the individual
that influence performance
Problem sensitivity 96 0.32
Inductive reasoning 93 0.37
Oral comprehension 85 0.38
Deductive reasoning 78 0.42
Skills—developed capacities that facilitate learning,
the more rapid acquisition of knowledge, or
performance of activities that occur across jobs
Service orientation 92 0.21
Social perceptiveness 90 0.17
Science 88 0.27
Critical thinking 87 0.37
Work activities—types of job behaviors
occurring on multiple jobs
Assisting and caring for others 96 —0.01
Identifying objects, actions, and events 95 0.26
Documenting/recording information 95 0.23
Monitor processes, materials, or
surroundings 91 0.20
Work context—physical and social factors
that influence the nature of work
0.27
0.17
0.03
0.18
-0.08
-0.06
0.12
-0.03
jobs among college-educated workers. The RN occupation receives a WC factor score of .29,
nearly a full standard deviation above the college workforce mean. In short, O*NET evaluates
RN jobs as requiring substantially higher cognitive skills and more demanding working
conditions than a typical job for college-educated workers. Other broad measures of required
occupational skills/tasks {SK2-SK4) among college workers are similar to or slightly below the
averages across all wage and salary workers.
Space does not permit presenting values for all O*NET job attributes, but examples of skill
attributes in which RNs are ranked high or low are provided in Tables 3a and 3b, along with the
simple correlation of each attribute with wages. By ordering workers in the college sample based
on the values on each O*NET attribute, percentile rankings for RNs can be compiled. RNs rank
near the 90th percentile or higher for several measures. RNs rate high on required abilities in
problem sensitivity and inductive reasoning; on the skills of service orientation and social
Consequence of error
Work with work group or team
Responsible for others' health and safety
Frequency of decision making
Work style—personal characteristics that can
affect how well someone performs a job
Concern for others
Self control
Adaptability/flexibility
Cooperation
96
91
89
89
95
95
95
94
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Table 3b. O*NET Skill Attributes for Which RNs Rate Low: Percentile Rank and
Wage Correlations
Description RN Rank Simple Wage Correlation
Abilities—enduring attributes of the individual
that influence performance
Mathematical reasoning 6
Visualization 7
Number facility 8
Skills—developed capacities that facilitate learning,
the more rapid acquisition of knowledge, or
performance of activities that occur across jobs
Management of financial resources 10
Installation 16
Programming 17
Work activities—types of job behaviors
occurring on multiple jobs
Scheduling work and activities 19
Communicating with persons outside
organization . 21
Interacting with computers 23
Work context—physical and social factors
that influence the nature of work
Degree of automation 18
Electronic mail 26
Level of competition 29
Work style—personal characteristics that can
affect how well someone performs a job"
Persistence 61
Leadership 62
Innovation 68
0.27
0.12
0.19
0.25
0.19
0.25
0.23
0.26
0.27
0.07
0.31
0.24
0.22
0.17
0.20
" RNs were in the 61st or higher percentile for all attributes in this group.
perspectives; on the work activities of identifying objects, actions, and events, and documenting/
recording information; and on work context attributes measuring the consequence of error and
frequency of decision making. Many of these job attributes display a strong correlation with
wages. RNs also rank high in some attributes weakly or negatively correlated with wages, for
example, concern for others, assisting and caring for others, working with a work group or team,
and adaptability/flexibility. Evident in Table 3b is that RNs rank low in some attributes that are
strong wage correlates. These include mathematical reasoning, management of financial resources,
programming skills, scheduling work and activities, communicating with persons outside one's
organization, interacting with computers, the level of competition, and use of E-mail.
Table 4 provides a comparison between RNs and the college control group for 19 of the 38
O*NET working condition attributes included in our WC index.^' The high percentile rankings
Omitted from the table are two "indoors" variables that are largely collinear with the outdoors variables; nine
variables that measure "time spent" in physical activities, such as sitting, standing, using hands, etc.; five strength
variables; and three work context variables measuring confiict situations and dealing with unpleasant or physically
aggressive people.
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Table 4. Selected Working Condition Index (WC) Components and the Percentile Rank
of RNs
Description RN Rank
Physical working conditions attributes included in WC
Physical proximity to others 95
Exposed to radiation 95
Exposed to disease or infections 95
Wear specialized protective or safety equipment 93
Cramped work space, awkward positions 93
Wear common protective or safety equipment 91
Exposed to hazardous conditions 88
Exposed to contaminants 88
Sounds, noise distracting or uncomfortable 83
Exposed to minor burns, cuts, bites, or stings . 83
Extremely bright or inadequate lighting 81
Exposed to whole body vibration 70
Exposed to hazardous equipment 60
Outdoors, under cover 47
In an enclosed vehicle or equipment 37
Very hot or cold temperatures 32
Exposed to high places 32
Outdoors, exposed to weather 23
In an open vehicle or equipment 11
Working condition index I¥C is described in the text.
among RNs reflect not only their demanding working conditions but also the relatively low
number of physical workplace disamenities in jobs populated by college-educated workers.
Among the working conditions in which RNs rank high are exposure to radiation, disease,
infection, hazardous conditions, and contaminants; physical proximity to others; cramped
work space or positions; and the wearing of protective or safety equipment. RNs rank low in
exposure to the elements, working in vehicles or equipment, exposure to extreme temperatures,
and exposure to high places.
The descriptive data from O*NET are revealing. They show that for a large number of
workplace skills and abilities, nursing jobs are evaluated as requiring a high level of skill. At the same
time, nursing involves several demanding working conditions.^ '^  Thus, some portion of the "high"
RN wage is likely to result from skills and working conditions not reflected in tj^ical wage analyses.
We now turn to wages, first using standard analysis and then introducing the O*NET job attributes.
5. Wage Analysis Using CPS Worker, Location, and Job Attributes
In this section, we provide "CPS-only" regression analysis comparing wages among RNs
and our comparison group of college-trained workers, with controls for individual and location
characteristics. By these measures, RNs are paid very well. We then extend the analysis to
include the O*NET indices accounting for job attributes.
^^  In work not shown, we compile descriptive evidence on O*NET "work value" descriptors not included in the wage
analysis. The nursing occupation tends to satisfy the specific needs associated with workers who value social service,
activity, co-workers, achievement, ability utilization, social status, and security. It is ranked low with respect to
satisfying needs for recognition, independence, working conditions, and company policies and practices.
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Wage regression estimates of the RN gap are presented in Table 5, using both a mixed
female/male comparison group with a gender dummy included and, for comparison, a female-
only comparison group.^^ The CPS-only log wage equations include potential experience (i.e.,
years since schooling completed) in quartic form, plus dummy variables for gender, BA and
MA degrees (vs. associate degree), race/ethnicity (three dummies for four groups), marital
status (2), foreign-born (citizen and noncitizen), year (3), city size (6), and region (8). The
unadjusted RN wage advantage is .182 log points relative to all college-educated workers, as
compared to .311 log points if the comparison group is restricted to women.
Standard log wage regression analysis, shown in line 1, indicates that RNs receive a large
wage premium of .325 log points (38.4%) compared to other college-educated workers. Using an
all-female control group, the RN wage advantage increases .03 log points, from .325 to .355. Using
the combined sample, moving from the unadjusted to the regression wage differential substantially
increases the RN gap (from .182 to .325), primarily as a result of the inclusion of the gender
dummy, effectively creating a female comparison group for 93% of the RN sample. Using the all-
female comparison group, the unadjusted and regression wage gaps are roughly similar (.311 and
.355), indicating that the comparison group choice based on education is a reasonable one.^ "*
We next use the merged CPS/O*NET database to incorporate job attributes and worker
characteristics into the wage analysis. Our approach is straightforward. We compare RN wage
gaps from standard log wage regressions with and without control for the O*NET factor
indices measuring workplace skills/tasks and working conditions, shown previously in Table 2
{SK1-SK4 and WQ}^ In preliminary analysis, we find that the relationship between log wages
and several of the job indices is highly nonlinear. Hence, we utilize a specification that includes
each of the indices in cubic form.^ ^
Row 1 of Table 5 shows RN log wage gap estimates based on use of OLS and the standard
Mincer form, with the percentage estimates based on exponentiated logs. Adding the O*NET
job attribute indices to the log wage equation reduces the RN gap estimate by .12 log points,
from .325, as seen previously, to .201, or from 38% to 22%. This large reduction in the wage
gap reflects the strong impact of both first factor SKI, which heavily loads on cognitive skill
measures and is strongly correlated with wages, and the working conditions index, WC, For
both SKI and WC, the RN occupation is rated highly as compared to the non-RN comparison
group (as seen in Table 2). The WC results are interesting. At the mean of the sample, WC (in
cubic form) has a modest negative relationship with wages, while at higher levels of the index,
such as those seen for RNs, there is strong evidence of compensating wage differentials.^'
^' Whereas prior tables have presented descriptive evidence using sample weights, regression estimates are unweighted.
Weighted least squares results using CPS sample weights produce similar estimates.
^'^ In order to isolate the effect of changing the comparison group, we retain male nurses and keep the same RN sample.
Since wage differences between male and female nurses are small, results are little affected.
^^  Because multiple workers are assigned common O*NET values for each occupation, all regression standard errors are
clustered on occupation. Absent clustering, standard errors are roughly a tenth as large as those shown.
^' RN wage gap estimates show some sensitivity in moving from single to higher-order terms of the indices since RNs
have relatively high and low values for several of the indices. Gap estimates change little, however, when terms beyond
the cubic are added. Because O*NET job attributes are measured at the occupation rather than the worker level,
measurement error may cause attenuation of coefficient estimates. Because of space constraints, we do not present
coefficients on the O*NET indices, focusing instead on RN wage gap estimates.
^' Although measuring compensating differentials is notoriously difficult owing to negative correlation between
workplace disamenities and unmeasured skills, the O*NET skill indices control for many of these skills.
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Table 5. RN/CoUege Regression Wage Gaps, Alternative Specifications and
Estimation Approaches
1. Mincer OLS log and
percentage wage gaps
Log gap
SE
As %
2. Dollar and percentage
wage gaps from OLS
linear wage model with
interactions
Dollar gap
SE
As %
3. Negative binomial
• log gaps
Log gap
SE
As %
No. RNs
No. controls
No. total sample
Mixed Comparison Group,
Raw Gap
0.182
0.030
20.0
$2.21
$1.01
8.2
0.079
0.038
8.2
Gender Dummy
CPS Controls
0.325
0.021
38.4
$6.54
$0.55
29.0
0.284
0.023
32.8
8292
135,593
143,885
Plus O'NET
0.201
0.046
22.2
$4.25
$1.35
17.1
0.194
0.050
21.5
Female Comparison
Raw Gap
0.311
0.025
36.5
$6.28
$0.63
27.5
0.243
0.027
27.5
CPS Only
0.355
0.022
42.6
$7.27
$0.54
33.3
0.312
0.024
36.6
8292
64,565
72,857
Group
Plus O'NET
0.160
0.057
17.3
$3.33
$1.48
12.9
0.130
0.061
13.9
Estimates are from unweighted regressions. Shown on the left side are RN wage gaps with a pooled female and
male college-educated comparison group. On the right side are results with an all-female control group. Log and dollar
gaps are the coefficients (standard error, SB) on an RN dummy variable. CPS controls include potential experience (i.e.,
years since schooling completed) in quartie form, plus dummy variables for gender (left-side results only), BA and MA
degrees (vs. associate degree), race/ethnicity (three dummies for four groups), marital status (2), foreign-born (citizen and
noncitizen), year (3), city size (6), and region (8). O*NET variables measuring skill and working conditions are factor
indices SKI through SK4 and WC, each in cubic form. Log gaps (ß) shown above are converted to percentages by
IOO[exp(P) - 1]. Percentage dollar gaps are calculated by [(TFiw —Wc)/'Wc] 100, where the numerator is the estimated
dollar gap and We is calculated by Wj)fi minus the gap, with Wufi equal to $29.08 (in January 2008 U.S. dollars).
Standard errors are clustered on occupation.
Using the female-only comparison group, once we account for job skills/tasks and working
conditions, the estimated RN differential is lower with the all-female control group than with the
mixed-gender group conditioning on gender, .16 versus .20 (17% vs. 22%). This difference is driven
by relatively large estimated effects of adverse working conditions in the female-only sample, a result
noted previously in the literature (Hersch 1998), coupled with more adverse working conditions
among RNs than among other coUege-educated women. The impact of the O'''NET skill indices
differs little between men and women. In short, the treatment of gender in the wage analysis matters
far less once one conditions on occupational job skillVtask requirements and working conditions.^^
Our analysis to this point shows that nursing is evaluated as requiring a high degree of
skills, that job skill/task requirements are strongly related to wages across the labor market, and
that RN log wage gap estimates decline sharply following control for these job attributes. These
estimates, however, continue to indicate a sizable RN wage advantage relative to long-run
' In fact, results are highly similar using the mixed gender comparison group without the gender dummy.
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opportunity costs, a result seemingly at odds with evidence of systematic nursing shortages. We
further explore this puzzle below.
6. Do Estimates from the Mincer Equation Overstate Relative Nursing Wages?
Descriptive evidence on weighted mean wages, seen in Table 1, revealed large differences
between RN wage gaps based on percentage differences in mean dollars and differences in
mean logs converted to a percentage. The same is true for means based on unweighted data
used in the statistical analysis. As seen in Table 5, the raw log wage difference between RNs and
the comparison group is .182 log points, or about 20.0%. In contrast, the percentage difference
in mean dollar wages, {Wj^^— Wc)lWc, is only 8.2%. The highly compressed distribution of
RN wages, as compared to the comparison group (i.e., thinner left and right tails), causes the
log wage gap (exponentiated) to provide a poor approximation of the percentage difference in
arithmetic means, at least for wage gaps absent controls.
Although the Mincerian semi-log wage equation remains the standard approach for
estimating percentage wage gaps in labor economics, Blackburn (2007) shows that it is not
appropriate in some applications and recommends an alternative nonparametric approach for
estimation of the Mincer equation.^' The Mincer model holds that
If u is homoskedastic then the model can be written and estimated in its standard semi-log
form, thus:
In W = A-ß-l-M.
The semi-log model provides consistent estimates of ß only tinder the assumption that the distribution
of the error term is independent of the regressors. In our case the assumption of homoskedasticity is
(grossly) violated since the error distribution is correlated with the RN indicator variable.
Below we provide estimates of the RN percentage wage gap using alternative methods.
First, we calculate the percentage differential from wage equations with the dollar wage rather
than log wage as the dependent variable, while interacting right-hand-side variables with all the
experience and schooling terms to allow nonlinear (i.e., multiplicative rather than additive)
wage effects, as predicted by human capital theory and modeled in the Mincer equation.
Second, we estimate the wage equation using a negative binomial general linear model (GLM)
with a log link, which allows for an alternative (more flexible) error distribution than does OLS
while retaining the assumption that the Mincer model is the correct specification.^" Third, we
provide a check on results by estimating RN percentage gaps from propensity score-matching
models that do not rely on the functional form of the wage equation. The matching approach,
used widely in recent years (e.g., see references in Imbens [2004]), allows direct calculation of
both the exponentiated log and arithmetic percentage wage gaps based on the same sample of
For a distinct but related discussion on the use and interpretation of log models, see Manning (1998).
We thank Amitabh Chandra for suggesting this approach. It is similar to the estimation strategy taken by Blackburn
(2007), although not his preferred method.
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RNs and a matched control group of non-RNs based on their similarity to the RN "treatment"
group (i.e., similar propensity scores that refiect the probability of being an RN).''
Table 5 provides alternative estimates of the RN percentage wage gaps using these
alternative approaches. The unadjusted log gap is .182 based on the mixed-gender comparison
group and .311 using the female-only comparison group, while the benchmark CPS-only log
(percentage) gap estimates are .325 (38.4%) and .355 (42.6%) using the mixed-gender and
female-only comparison groups, respectively. Corresponding estimates, controlling for O*NET
job attributes, are .201 (22.2%) and .160 (17.3%).
Our alternative approaches clearly show that percentage estimates from an exponentiated
OLS log gap overstate the RN wage differential. In line 2 of Table 5, direct calculation of the
arithmetic percentage RN gap from a linear wage regression model (with interaction terms)
produces gap estimates that are roughly 10 percentage points lower than those seen previously
using the standard CPS-only model, from 38.4% to 29.0% for the mixed control group and
from 42.6% to 33.3% with the female control group. The same qualitative results occur with the
augmented O*NET job attribute estihiates, although the differences are about half as large with
these densely specified models. Direct calculation of the arithmetic percentages reduces the
CPS/O*NET RN gap estimates from 22.2% to 17.1% with the mixed-gender control group and
from 17.3% to 12.9% with the female control group.'^ In short, standard OLS estimates of the
Mincerian gap substantially overstate relative RN wage differentials.
We obtain similar estimates using the GLM negative binomial log link estimates, as seen in
hne 3 of Table 5. This approach provides estimates of the Mincer model using less restrictive
assumptions regarding the error term distribution. In the CPS-only estimates with the mixed
control group, the GLM estimate is .284, or 32.8%, much lower than the standard OLS
estimate of 38.4% and modestly higher than the 29.0% obtained from the linear model. Using
the female control group, the GLM estimate is 36.6%, in between the standard 42.6% estimate
and the 33.3% estimate from the linear model. The GLM estimate for our preferred CPS/
O*NET model is .194, or 21.5%, using the mixed-gender sample and .130, or 13.9%, using the
female-only control group, in each case being between the standard OLS and linear model
estimates. These results indicate that GLM estimation of the Mincer model provides a
reasonable alternative to standard OLS estimation. We would argue (as does Blackburn [2007])
that use of such models warrants consideration as a standard robustness check. It is particularly
important that such an approach be considered in applications in which conditional or
unconditional wage distributions differ greatly between comparison and control groups.
A third approach we consider is the use of propensity score-matching models to estimate
RN percentage wage gaps. The matching approach addresses two concerns. First, matching
methods explicitly create non-RN control groups of workers based on their similarity to the
RN "treatment" group. Thus, matching methods permit us to check if RN regression wage gap
estimates are sensitive to the perhaps-inappropriate data support or weighting of non-RNs
implicit in OLS. Second, matching estimators allows us to directly compile not only the log
" A referee suggested a fourth approach—the use of quantile regression given the compressed distribution of RNs wages
relative to the control group. As expected, quantile regressions result in RN wage gap estimates that decrease as one
moves from low to high quantités. This pattern is strong absent controls and using the CPS-only specification, but it is
greatly reduced in the specification with O*NET job attribute measures.
^^  Percentage dollar gap estimates are calculated by [{Witf¡ — Wc)/Wc]lOO, where {W/m—Wc) is measured by the
regression estimate of the conditional dollar gap and the counterfactual We is calculated as W^n minus the gap. The
unweighted mean WRU equals $29.08 (in January 2008 U.S. dollars).
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Table 6. RN/CoUege Wage Gaps with Nearest Neighbor Propensity Score Matched Samples
1. Log gap
SE
As %
2. Dollar gap
SE
As %
No. RNs
No. unique matches
No. total sample
Mixed Comparison
ATT
0.333
0.008
39.5
$6.77
$0.22
30.3
CPS Controls
OLS Gap
0.328
0.024
38:8
$6.71
$0.62
30.0
8292
6859 .
15,151
Group
Plus O*NET
OLS Gap
0.124
0.060
13.3
$2.41
$1.58
9.0
Female Comparison
ATT
0.351
0.008
42.1
$7.29
$0.21
33.4
CPS Controls
OLS Gap
0.350
0.023
42.0
$7.31
$0.58
33.6
8292
6678
14,970
Group
Plus O*NET
OLS Gap
0.141
0.061
15.2
$3.21
$1.53
12.4
Results are unweighted. Shown on the left side are RN wage gaps with a mixed female and male comparison group
identified by nearest neighbor propensity score matching with replacement (excluding ties), with the RN logit model
including all CPS controls from the wage equation, including gender (see Table 5 note), plus selected interaction terms.
The right-side analysis is identical, except that RNs are matched to an all-female comparison group. The OLS log wage
and dollar wage regressions are based on the identical matched samples, with the specifications equivalent to the OLS-
only and O*NET-augmented specifications seen in Table 5. OLS standard errors are clustered on occupation, but the
matching ATT standard errors are not.
wage gap (i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated, or ATT, in log differences) but also
the percentage difference in the dollar ATT between the same RNs and the control group.
The propensity score-matching differentials are estimated as follows. First, a logit model
estimates propensity scores that measure the likelihood of workers being an RN, conditional
on the explanatory variables previously included in the wage equations.^^ All individuals are
ordered from low to high based on their propensity scores. Each "treatment-group" RN is then
matched to "control group" non-RNs using nearest neighbor matching, which for each RN
searches up and down in the propensity score distribution for the non-RN with the closest
score. We match with replacement in order to insure selection of the closest matches and use a
single control group match for each "treated" RN (i.e., "ties" are excluded). Matching results
are not sensitive to the specific methods and options used. Propensity scores are estimated
without inclusion of the O*NET occupational indices, letting the determinants of RN
employment be based entirely on pre-market characteristics and not on job attributes. Results
from these models are directly comparable to the CPS-only regression results. In practical
terms, we are unable to estimate RN logit models with a rich set of O*NET variables because
such models perfectly predict RN employment. However, we can estimate CPS/O*NET
regression wage equations using the RNs and the matched control group sample obtained from
the CPS-only logit model (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
Table 6 provides the log and dollar RN wage gaps based on the matching estimators using
CPS-propensity score conditioning variables. These estimates are virtually identical to those
obtained from the CPS-only regression analysis. For example, using the mixed comparison
group, the log wage ATT (i.e., the difference between mean log wages for RNs and their
matched comparison group) is .333, or 39.5%, while the ATT using the percentage difference in
•'^  The matching models are estimated using Stata procedure psmatch2. Our logit models add interaction terms between
several of the explanatory variables (e.g., gender and potential experience, marital status and education, and foreign-
born status and education). Estimates are nearly identical using probit rather than logit estimation.
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mean dollar wages is 30.3% (column 1 of Table 6). This compares to earlier OLS estimates of
38.4% and 29.0%, respectively. Thus, narrowing the comparison group (the support) to those
with similar CPS attributes has little impact on estimates. Similarly, running OLS regressions
on the RN/nearest-neighbor matched sample (columns 2 and 3 for the mixed-gender and
female-only samples, respectively), either with or without the O*NET variables, produces
estimates nearly identical to those seen previously in Table 5.
In summary, standard Mincerian log wage analysis using data on worker and location
attributes implies large RN wage premiums of about 40%. These estimates greatly overstate
relative RN wages for two reasons. First, they fail to account for the high level of compensable
skills/tasks required for RNs and their relatively demanding working conditions. Second, the more
compressed distribution of wages among RNs compared to their control group causes standard
OLS estimates of the Mincer equation to substantially overstate estimates of RN log and
percentage wage gaps. Accounting for occupational job attributes and estimating percentage wage
gaps using arguably preferable methods produce RN wage gap estimates of about 15% rather than
40%. Once one accounts for detailed job characteristics, the choice of a female-only or mixed-
gender comparison group (with a gender dummy) makes little difference. In short, wages for RNs
are far closer to long-run opportunity costs than standard analysis indicates, making regular
shortages among RNs less puzzling. That being said, a 15% wage advantage, although far less
than 40%, is neither zero nor negative. Absent evidence for nursing wages below opportunity
costs, as implied by the monopsony model, nursing shortages remain a puzzle, albeit a less serious
one than has been implied by prior wage analyses. We return to this issue in the concluding section.
7. Robustness Checks and Caveats
In addition to the results previously presented, our key results proved invariant to other
robustnesss checks. Issues raised by referees included exclusion of those with allocated
occupation, estimation of a sample consisting entirely of those with BA degrees, and separate
estimates for samples in their first and second years in the CPS. Additional issues are whether
gap estimates should be based on the control group wage equation parameters and whether
union status should be included as a wage equation control variable.
Omission of the . 1 % of workers with occupation imputed (following omission of imputed
earners) changes log wage gap coefficient estimates at the fourth decimal place. Estimation
using only nurse and control group BAs reduced the combined sample by 47%. This had
surprisingly little effect on the raw log gap (change at the third decimal point), it moderately
lowered the CPS-only RN gap estimates, and it had little effect on the CPS-O*NET estimates.^"
Because households are in CPS outgoing rotation groups 4 and 8 in the same month in
consecutive years, a significant portion of the sample is included in the sample during two
years. Separate estimates for rotation groups 4 and 8 eliminate all overlap, thus proving that
they are unique samples. These two samples produce highly similar estimates, with all
differences in log wage gaps at the third decimal place.
The RN log gaps presented in this article are based on intercept shifts for RNs in a pooled
wage equation. This approach was chosen in large part for ease of presentation. If the
•''' The rationale for a BA-only analysis is that education investments among RNs and non-RNs with BAs would be more
comparable than for RNs with diploma or associate degree certification or with graduate education.
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"treatment" group is sufficiently small, slope coefficient estimates in the pooled sample will be
close to those from a control group wage equation. Thus, wage gap estimates using the dummy
variable approach should closely approximate Blinder-Oaxaca gap estimates using control
group slopes to calculate the explained portion of the gap. As the treatment group becomes
large, substantive differences in slopes may arise. RNs form a sufficiently large occupation to
have some impact on market-wide wage parameters. However, when we recalculate RN gap
estimates using control group-only wage equation parameters, all log gap estimates are nearly
identical to those obtained from the pooled equations, differences being no larger than .002.
A final issue is treatment of union status, which we did not include in the wage equations.
Control variables (e.g., schooling) generally are intended to capture equalizing wage
differentials associated with skills, working conditions, and location. Arguably, the union
wage advantage largely reflects a premium above opportunity costs and should not be netted
out of the RN wage gap. Adding union membership to the wage equation, however, has
virtually no effect on estimated RN differentials: The reason is that among college-educated
workers, union premiums estimated in a cross section are close to zero.^^ Thus, the decision of
whether or not to include union status as a control does not affect the results.
Finally, prior analysis showed that RN wages are far less dispersed than are control group
wages; in fact, RN wages are less dispersed than are wages for most occupations (see footnote 12). In
a related vein, O*NET evaluates nursing highly as an occupation that satisfies workers who value
security (see footnote 22). To the extent that wage and employment risk are not captured in our job
attribute indices, this would cause us to understate RN relative wages by some unknown degree.
8. Otber Explanations for "High" Wages? Benefits and Shift Work
This study focuses on earnings differences between RNs and similar workers and jobs. A
more complete analysis would account for nonwage benefits and focus on total compensation.
Unfortunately, household data providing information on worker attributes generally do not
report the dollar costs of benefits, while business surveys providing information on beneflt costs
do not report worker characteristics. Hence, multivariate analysis of RN benefits relative to a
control group is not possible.
Published data on employer beneflt costs for RNs, however, indicate that benefits for RNs
during the period under study are no larger—and indeed are probably smaller—than for
workers economy-wide. The Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2008a) provides data on compensation, dividing it between
wages and salaries versus benefits, the latter including a comprehensive set of voluntary and
mandated benefits (mandatory being Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, etc.).
In June 2008, benefits as a percent of total hourly compensation among private-sector RNs (table
Hirsch and Schumacher (1998) show that the standard result of union wage gaps declining with education is due
largely to two-sided selection into union status; that is, positive (negative) selection among those with low (high)
education. To the extent that union representation produces premiums for nurses, this helps explain the finding of
wage rates above long-run opportunity costs. Using our unweighted RN sample, among whom 17.1% are members,
we obtain an estimated .07 log point union premium from a wage equation including membership, hospital
employment, and the CPS variables in our base specification.
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27, p. 285) measured 25.9%-$11.50 in benefits, $32.90 in wages and salaries, and $44.40 in
compensation. For all full-time private-sector workers the corresponding figure is 27.2% of
compensation—$8.26 in benefits, $22.16 in wages and salaries, and $30.42 in compensation
(table 19, p. 224).^ ^ Based on these figures, it is fair to conclude that benefits as a percent of
total compensation are somewhat lower for RNs than for comparable (e.g., college-educated)
workers and jobs economy-wide.^' If anything, our estimates of the RN wage gap are likely to
slightly overstate the compensation gap.
An issue not formally addressed in this article is the difference in timing of work.
Healthcare workers are more likely to work weekends and nonstandard shifts. A BLS
newsletter (U.S. BLS 2008b) reports that healthcare workers are more likely to work on
weekends and holidays than are workers economy-wide. Using information from the 2003-
2007 American Time Use Surveys they report that on a given weekday, 80% of full-time
healthcare practitioner and technical workers (a category that includes RNs) are working,
compared to 88.1% of workers in non-health occupations. On holidays and weekends, 35.1% of
the health employees are working, compared to 31.2% of non-health employees.
Failure to account for timing of work is likely to bias upward estimates of the RN wage
gap.^ ^ It is difficult to "price" time of work differentials owing to selection into workdays and
shifts selection (e.g., Kostiuk 1990). We construct a rough back-of-the-envelope estimate.
Schiunacher and Hirsch (1997) examine differences in earnings for RNs from shift work. Based on
the May 1985 and 1991 CPS Dual Job Supplements, they find that 57% of RNs work day shifts,
with others split between night, evening, rotating or split, and other shifts. Relative to a day shift,
they estimate differentials for night work of 11% and differentials for the other shifts of about 4%.
Assume that such scheduling and shift differentials for RNs hold today (they may be lower, given
decreased RN employment in hospitals). Published information from the May 2004 CPS
supplement on flexible and shift schedules provides recent data for full-time workers economy-
wide. As compared to the 57% of RNs who have day schedules, the economy-wide figure is 85%.
Based on the differences between RNs and workers economy-wide for each shift category, coupled
with the wage differential estimates by Hirsch and Schumacher, we calculate that the RN wage
differential would be .018 log points lower if adjusted for shift work.^' Although this is a rough
estimate, it reinforces our conclusion that relative pay among nurses is overstated by standard
wage regression analysis and is closer to opportunity costs than indicated by standard analysis.
9. Interpretation and Conclusions: Can the Shortage Puzzle Be Resolved?
Our principal finding is that wage differences between RNs and similar workers and
jobs economy-wide are substantially smaller than implied by standard log wage gap estimates
in the literature, on the order of 15% or less, as opposed to the 40% indicated by standard
'^ The ECEC ineludes supplemental pay (e.g., overtime and shift pay) as benefits. The figures shown in the text subtract
supplemental pay from benefits and add them to wages and salary. Absent the shift of supplemental pay, benefits as a
percentage of total compensation are 29.5% for RNs and 30.5% for full-time private-sector workers. The private-
seetor comparison is used sinee the full-time/part-time breakdown is not otherwise provided.
^' This conclusion is consistent with results presented in McHugh et al. (2011) showing that a low level of benefits
(particularly pension benefits) was a particularly strong source for job dissatisfaction among nurses in four states.
•" Shift work is not directly measured in O'NET, although it may be correlated with measured job attributes.
' ' The details of this calculation are available on request.
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analysis."" Two principal reasons lead to this result. First, the RN occupation reqtiires unusually high
skill levels, as compared to typical jobs populated by workers with similar levels of schooling, skill
requirements and tasks not fully reflected in the CPS or other household data. In addition, nursing
jobs involve more difficult working conditions than do most jobs filled by college-educated workers.
Controlling for occupational attributes sharply reduces estimates of the RN wage advantage. Second,
Mincerian regression log wage gaps estimated by OLS substantially overstate the percentage wage
gaps among nurses owing to a substantially more compressed wage distribution among RNs
than among any broad-based comparison group. Using three alternative procedures to estimate
percentage differentials, we obtain estimates showing much smaller nursing wage differentials. A third
estimation issue—the treatment of gender—turns out to be relatively unimportant once one provides
a rich set of controls for job skill/task requirements and working conditions.
We conclude that RNs receive wages moderately but not vastly greater than opportunity
costs. This conclusion sharply reduces, but does not eliminate, the nursing shortage puzzle.
How can one explain high vacancy rates and shortages if RN wage rates, on average, are
moderately above opportunity costs? Although answering such a question with a formal
analysis is beyond the scope of our article, we believe that reasoned argument coupled with
evidence points us in the right direction.
We rule out a monopsony explanation for the puzzle since, contrary to evidence, it implies
wages below rather than above competitive levels. More convincing explanations for shortages,
we would suggest, should focus on adjustment difficulties on the demand and supply sides of the
mai'ket.'" Such explanations can account for high vacancy rates despite wages above opportunity
cost. Perhaps most important, entry into the nursing profession is constrained, with available
training slots below the number of qualified applicants. Constraints on nursing program
enrollments stem from several sources, but key factors are the limited growth in nursing
education opportunities (relative to demand) and the difficulty in hiring qualified nursing faculty
at the salary levels funded by educational institutions (e.g., Spetz and Given 2003; Rahn and
Wartman 2007; Aiken and Cheung 2008). The American Association of Colleges of Nursing
(2009) reports increasing enrollments (but at declining rates of increase) during the 2000s, with
record numbers of qualified applicants turned away from baccalaureate programs—29.4, 37.5,
38.4, 36.4, and 41.4 thousand during the 2004-2008 time period. A shortage of nursing faculty is
the primary reason cited for rejecting applicants. These "turn-away" figures can be compared to
the 63.3 thousand BA nursing degrees conferred in the 2007-2008 academic year (Snyder and
Dillow 2010 [table 275])."^
'"' Our 2005-2008 sample period was a time of relatively high RN wages. Using CPS data, the ratio of mean RN wages to
female wages economy-wide was relatively constant over the years 2003-2009 (it declined in 2010) but about 4
percentage points higher than in 1997-2002. Had our analysis been performed for these earlier (or possibly future)
years, we would likely find RN wages closer to long-run opportunity costs.
"' Long, Goldfarb, and Goldfarb (2008) develop models in which "economic" and "professional standards" shortages can
result. One model focuses on the choice between hiring permanent staff nurses and temporary contract nurses. A second
posits hospitals as "premier" or "funds-constrained" and shows that the type of shortage can vary with type of hospital.
"^  U.S.-educated first-time pass rates on NCLEX-RN licensing exams were 88.4% in 2009 (National Council of State
Boards of Nursing 2010). If incremental admittees were to have similar pass rates, newly licensed RNs would increase
proportionally to the increases in program admissions. The 2009 federal stimulus bill (the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act) provides funding for nurse training and instruction (Domrose 2009). The 2010 health care reform
legislation (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act) addresses projected shortages and retention of nurses by increasing the capacity for education,
supporting training programs, providing loan repayment and retention grants, and creating a career ladder to nursing
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).
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Nursing supply constraints produce relatively inelastic short-run RN labor supply
curves, with short-run market-clearing wages well above the long-run opportunity costs
measured by our wage analysis. Because there has been rising demand for nurses over time
and because hospital budgets are constrained and adjust with considerable lags, nursing wages
can be above opportunity costs and at the same time below short-run market-clearing levels. In
short, institutional constraints on nurse training likely lead to shortages coexisting with wages
moderately above long-run opportunity costs."*^  While the supply constraint in training can
explain wage advantages for RNs compared to other college-educated workers, we show that the
size of the wage advantage is not nearly as large as standard analysis indicates.''^
An additional supply explanation is that labor supply among nurses, particularly married
women, appears to be countercyclical (Buerhaus 1993; Buerhaus, Staiger, and Auerbach 2003).
Such changes in labor force participation will be exacerbated, if not create periodic shortages,
during high-demand periods, while working in the opposite direction during low-demand
periods. Evidence during the recent economic downturn supports this argument (Evans 2009;
RWJF 2009). Such a pattern should be stronger the more positively correlated is hospital (and
other health-industry) demand with the national economy.
Our evidence shows that RNs are neither "underpaid" nor substantially "overpaid" as
implied by standard wage analyses. Although important data and methodological issues
accompany all wage analyses, such issues have proven particularly important in analyzing
nursing wages. Our preferred estimates of nursing wage differentials (ignoring shift work and
benefits) are that average RN wages exceed long-run opportunity cost by roughly 15%, the
same order of magnitude as seen for unions (Hirsch and Macpherson 2010; table 2) and
professional licensing (Kleiner and Krueger 2010).
Apart from what the analysis tells us about nursing labor markets, there are two more
general implications of this research. First, wage analyses can be enriched by supplementing
standard worker and location attributes with job-based measures of compensable skills, job
tasks, and working conditions. O*NET provides an unusually rich set of occupation-based
measures. Second, the standard approach for estimating Mincerian log wage gaps can be
questioned not just in the (perhaps extreme) case of nurses but whenever one compares a single
occupation or "narrow" treatment group to a (generally appropriate) broad comparison group.
There is no shortage of such examples in the labor economics literature.
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